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GLOBAL STANDARDS FOR SECURITIES
HOLDING INFRASTRUCTURES:
A SOFT LAW/FINTECH MODEL FOR REFORM
Charles W. Mooney, Jr.*

I. Introduction
This Article outlines a “soft-law-to-hard-law” approach for the development and implementation of reforms to systems for the holding of publicly traded securities. It proposes the development of global standards for securities holding systems (“Global Standards”), to be led by the International
1
Organization of Securities Commissions (the “IOSCO”). This approach
contemplates that States would be encouraged and expected to implement
the Global Standards by adopting “hard law” reforms through statutory and
regulatory adjustments to their securities holding systems as well as modifications of the architecture of their securities holding systems. The successes
of past IOSCO initiatives inspire this Article’s proposal, as do the relatively
successful development and implementation of harmonized standards for
supervision and capital adequacy for depository institutions (for example,
2
banks) through the operation of the Basel Committee.
*
Charles A. Heimbold, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law
School. I wish to thank the participants in the symposium The Role of “Soft Law” in International Insolvency and Commercial Law, sponsored by the International Insolvency Institute
and the University of Michigan Law School, September 21–22, 2018, for helpful comments
on a presentation of an outline of this Article. I also express my appreciation to Francisco
Garcimartín, Sarah Hammer, Thomas Keijser, Kumiko Koens, and Andrea Tosato for helpful
conversations. The conclusions reached here and any errors are mine alone, however. I also
thank Penn Law for generous support during the preparation of this Article.
1.
For background on the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(“IOSCO”), see generally OICV-IOSCO, https://www.iosco.org (last visited Mar. 8, 2019).
For discussions of the nature of and distinctions between “soft” and “hard” law see, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb, Soft and Hard Strategies in the Crafting of International Commercial Law,
40 MICH. J. INT’L L. 433 (2019); Henry Deeb Gabriel, The Use of Soft Law in the Creation of
Legal Norms in International Commercial Law: How Successful Has It Been?, 40 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 413 (2019); John A. E. Pottow, The Dialogic Aspect of Soft Law in International Insolvency: Discord, Digression, and Development, 40 MICH. J. INT’L L. 479 (2019); Irit Mevorach, A Fresh View on the Hard/Soft Law Divide: Implications for International Insolvency
of Enterprise Groups, 40 MICH. J. INT’L L. 505 (2019).
I refer to the Global Standards discussed here as “soft” law to indicate that they would
not have the force of law unless and until implemented by a State. See infra note 51 (discussing soft law aspects of the proposed Global Standards).
2.
The Basel Committee operates under the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland. For background, see MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., FINANCIAL
REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 272–74 (2016). For later developments, see id. at 285–331.
For additional discussion of the Basel Committee, see infra Part V.
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Intermediaries play central—indeed essential—roles in the holding systems addressed in this Article and in the securities markets more generally.
In particular, they are necessary players in existing systems for trading (for
example, on exchanges and other trading platforms) and settling trades of
3
securities. In most financial markets, the systems for holding securities after trades have settled are intermediated holding systems. Securities are
transferred to and acquired by investors, as beneficial owners, through electronic credits to their securities accounts held with intermediaries such as
stockbrokers and banks.
Intermediated holding systems are amalgams of information technology, regulatory constraints, contractual terms, and private law. For present
purposes, the relevant private law embraces respect for contractual obligations, legally imposed rights and duties, and proprietary rights and interests
4
in securities. In general, this private law is embodied in laws governing
shares in corporations and in the laws governing debt securities. It also encompasses the rights and interests—if any—of an investor vis-a-vis the issuer of securities and the rights and interests acquired by an account holder
upon the credit of securities to a securities account. All intermediated holding systems necessarily involve some degree of intermediation between is5
suers of securities and investors holding securities as account holders. This
intermediation necessarily imposes some risk—intermediary risk—
consisting of the risk of loss or damage to an investor arising out of the default or insolvency of an intermediary. Intermediary risk is a function of the
structure of a particular holding system, including the holding infrastructure
and its relevant technology, the relevant private law of property and contract, legal and contractual duties that underpin the holding structure, the
regulatory framework, and the relevant insolvency laws.
IOSCO has recently addressed intermediary risk in two important re6
ports on the protection of client assets (“Client Asset Reports”). While it
3.
The settlement of trades involves the transfer, generally referred to as a “delivery,”
of securities against payment for the securities.
4.
One standard definition of “private law” is: “That portion of the law that defines,
regulates, enforces, and administers relationships among individuals, associations, and corporations. As used in distinction to public law, the term means that part of the law that is administered between citizen and citizen, or that is concerned with the definition, regulation, and
enforcement of rights in cases where both the person in whom the right inheres and the person
upon whom the obligation rests are private individuals.” West’s Encyclopedia of American
Law (2d ed. 2008), https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/private+law (last visited
Mar. 28, 2019).
5.
In general, references to an “investor” mean the beneficial owner holding in an intermediated holding system as an account holder. References to an “account holder” also encompass those who hold in an intermediated system as an intermediary or otherwise on behalf
of investors.
6.
IOSCO, RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE PROTECTION OF CLIENT ASSETS
(2014), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD436.pdf [hereinafter 2014
IOSCO REPORT]; IOSCO, THEMATIC REVIEW OF THE ADOPTION OF THE PRINCIPLES SET
FORTH IN IOSCO’S REPORT: RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE PROTECTION OF CLIENT
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seems clear that intermediary risk should be an important focus of the proposed Global Standards, the proposal here contemplates an approach to
holding systems that is broader and more holistic than that taken in the Client Asset Reports. The analysis of intermediary risk should consider the information technology infrastructure employed for the operation of a holding
system, the relevant regulatory regime, the applicable private law, and in7
solvency laws. It should also consider the potential for disintermediation
that would essentially eliminate intermediary risk from securities holding
systems. The principal goal of this Article is to make the case for Global
Standards pursuant to an IOSCO-led soft-law-to-hard-law enterprise. However, a detailed explication of the appropriate specific content of the Global
Standards is beyond the scope of this Article.
Finally, development of Global Standards should take account of the
8
rapidly evolving financial technology, or Fintech. As George Walker has
summarized this phenomenon:
[FinTech] has emerged as a powerful new market force as a result
of the coming together of a number of disconnected trends. Significant advances have occurred in the areas of computer and digital
technology, the Internet, mobile telecommunications, and economics and finance, which have transformed traditional areas of study
and created important potential new business structures and opera9
tions.

ASSETS ((2017), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD577.pdf [hereinafter
2017 IOSCO REPORT]. References to the “client” in this context refer to an investor/account
holder holding through an intermediated holding system.
7.
See infra Part IV (discussing intermediary risk and the potential scope of the Global
Standards). Recognizing this possibility of disintermediation, in general, references here are to
“holding systems” instead of “intermediated holding systems.” By focusing here on holding
systems, I do not intend to suggest that reforms that would reduce risk and enhance efficiency
in trading platforms and settlement systems should not also be addressed—they should.
8.
As described in Investopedia: “Fintech is used to describe new tech that seeks to
improve and automate the delivery and use of financial services. At its core, fintech is utilized
to help companies, business owners and consumers better manage their financial operations,
processes and lives by utilizing specialized software and algorithms that are used on computers and, increasingly, smartphones. . . When fintech emerged in the 21st Century, the term
was initially applied to technology employed at the back-end systems of established financial
institutions. Since then, however, there has been a shift to more consumer-oriented services
and therefore a more consumer-oriented definition. Fintech has expanded to include any technological innovation in — and automation of — the financial sector, including advances in
financial literacy, advice and education, as well as streamlining of wealth management, lending and borrowing, retail banking, fundraising, money transfers/payments, investment management and more.” Julia Kagan, Fintech, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/f/fintech.asp#ixzz4aZxr0YMG (last updated Mar. 13, 2019).
9.
George Walker, Financial Technology Law: A New Beginning and a New Future,
34 GPSOLO 76, 76 (2017). For an interesting and thorough analysis of Fintech that “takes a
deeper and more encompassing systemic view of fintech, both as a financial market phenomenon and as a regulatory challenge,” see Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech as
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Indeed, the potential of distributed ledger technology (“DLT,” also known
as “blockchain”) has assumed an important, even dominant, role in the cur10
rent discussions of the evolution of the financial markets.
Following this Introduction, Part II of this Article provides an overview
of various typical types of securities holding infrastructures as they exist today. Part III summarizes the roles of private law and the regulation of markets and market participants as they relate to securities holding systems. It
also describes certain reform efforts in recent years. Part IV outlines a case
for reforming securities holding infrastructures. Although a full analysis is
beyond the scope of this Article, Part IV explains that the prospect for reducing intermediary risk and the emerging role of Fintech provide support
for the approach advocated here. Part V considers the possible content of
Global Standards for securities holding infrastructures that would be developed by an IOSCO-led soft-law-to-hard-law project and the need for a mission statement for the project. Part VI concludes.

II. Overview of Intermediated Securities
Holding Infrastructures
There are many different types of intermediated securities holding infrastructures. The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(“UNIDROIT”) Legislative Guide on Intermediated Securities (“Legislative
11
Guide”) identifies five general models of holding systems. While the models have much in common, they reflect variations on the proprietary rights
12
in securities and the legal relationships among account holders, their relea Systemic Phenomenon 4 (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 18-39,
2018), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3224393.
10.
See, e.g., Philipp Paech, The Governance of Blockchain Financial Networks, 80
MOD. L. REV. 1073 (2017) (discussing adaptation of private law, regulatory regimes, and private international law (choice of law) to financial markets consisting of distributed ledger
technology (“DLT”)-based networks). Neither of the Client Asset Reports discusses Fintech
or the potential role of DLT and other emerging technologies as potential tools for managing
or eliminating intermediary risk. However, given the discrete goal of recommending improvements to holding systems as they exist, these Fintech issues and developments may appropriately be considered beyond the scope of those reports.
11.
Unidroit Legislative Guide on Intermediated Securities 16–22 (2017),
https://www.unidroit.org/instruments/capital-markets/legislative-guide [hereinafter Legislative Guide]. The following description of these holding structures is drawn from the discussion in the Legislative Guide. The descriptions are general and illustrate the principal differences among the various systems that are relevant to this discussion but do not cover all of the
many details of each system. I omit discussion here of one of the models, the “contractual
model,” because it does not confer on an account holder a private-law proprietary interest, and
its effectiveness as a holding structure depends largely on the treatment of account holders in
the insolvency of a relevant intermediary. See id. at 21–22.
12.
The Legislative Guide’s Glossary provides helpful definitions. It defines “[a]ccount
holder” as “[a] person in whose name an intermediary maintains a securities account, whether
that person is acting for its own account or for others (including in the capacity of intermediary).” Id. at xxi.
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vant intermediaries, and a central securities depositary (“CSD”). The individual ownership model, used in countries such as France, contemplates
that the investor (that is, the ultimate account holder at the bottom tier) has
15
complete ownership of the securities credited to its account. Correspondingly, neither the CSD nor any other intermediaries in the holding chain has
any interest in the securities. Other countries such as Austria and Germany
use the co-ownership model, which involves the deposit of a global security
16
certificate with the CSD. The CSD credits the accounts of its account
holders (its “participants”) with their respective units of the relevant securi17
ty, and the participants in turn credit the accounts of their account holders.
The ultimate account holder has a co-ownership of its share of the pooled
securities held at the CSD.
The trust model—used in Australia, England and Wales, and Ireland—
18
provides that the CSD acts as the register for the issuers of securities. The
CSD itself has no interest in the securities, but it credits its participants with
their respective units of the securities. The participants are the legal owners
of the securities, either for their own accounts or for the benefit of their account holders. The participants credit securities to their account holders’ accounts and act as trustees for their account holders. As trust beneficiaries,
the account holders have a beneficial, equitable interest in the securities. In
Canada and the United States, the security entitlement model provides that
every account holder in the holding chain, including participants of the
19
CSD, acquires a security entitlement. A security entitlement confers sui
generis rights against the relevant intermediary and to the securities held by
20
the intermediary. Account holders (“entitlement holders”) do not have direct rights against the issuers of securities.
Securities holding systems are also classified as “transparent” or “non21
transparent” systems. As described in the Legislative Guide, in a transparent system,
an investor’s holdings are identified by, or known to, the CSD primarily because the role of maintaining a securities account is
shared between the CSD (which is the relevant intermediary . . . )

13.
See id. at xxvii (defining “[r]elevant intermediary” as “[t]he intermediary that, in
relation to a securities account, maintains that securities account for the account holder.”).
14.
See id. at xxii (defining “[c]entral securities depository (CSD)” as “[a]n entity that
provides the initial recording of securities in a book-entry system or that provides and maintains the securities accounts at the top tier of the intermediated holding chain.”).
15.
Id. at 17.
16.
Id. at 18.
17.
Id.
18.
Id. at 19.
19.
Id. at 20.
20.
Id.
21.
Id. at 22.
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and other persons often called account operators, who are securities
22
firms maintaining commercial relationships with investors.
The Legislative Guide identifies three general types of transparent systems.
In the first type, each investor holds securities in a separate account with the
23
CSD. Intermediaries (referred to as “account operators”) operate the accounts and act as interfaces between the investor and the CSD. In a second
type of transparent system, an investor holds securities in an account with
24
an intermediary at the CSD level. The intermediary’s account with the
CSD has a sub-account for each investor that reflects the investor’s holdings. A third type of transparent system involves an omnibus account of the
25
intermediary with the CSD. The intermediary maintains a separate account
for each of its investors. Information as to the investor accounts is consolidated as between the CSD and the intermediary so that the CSD can ascertain each investor’s holdings. In a forthcoming chapter, Thomas Keijser and
I advance and defend our claim that the adoption and implementation of a
transparent information technology system for securities holding could pro26
vide substantial benefits, even without any change in law. We also argue
that implementing a transparent information technology system could serve
as a catalyst and a roadmap for law reforms affecting securities holding sys27
tems.
Each of these securities holding systems takes a different approach to
the relevant private law. In particular, they vary as to who holds proprietary
rights and as to the nature of those rights. But each also generally protects
the rights of account holders against claims of general creditors in case of
the insolvency of a relevant intermediary. Even so, a relevant intermediary’s
insolvency proceeding nonetheless could impose material risks with respect
to the prompt realization of an account holder’s rights in respect of securi28
ties.
22.
Id.
23.
Id. at 22–24.
24.
Id. at 23–24.
25.
Id. at 24–25.
26.
Thomas Keijser & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Intermediated Securities Holding Systems Revisited: A View Through The Prism Of Transparency, in INTERMEDIATION AND
BEYOND 309 (Louise Gullifer & Jennifer Payne eds., 2019).
27.
Id. at 331–35. As a corollary, we explain that non-transparent information technology systems are sources of or contributors to various problems in securities holding systems.
Id.
28.
See, e.g., Charles W. Mooney, Jr. & Guy Morton, Harmonizing Insolvency Law for
Intermediated Securities: The Way Forward, in TRANSNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW 193
(Thomas Keijser ed., 2013) (explaining inter alia the difficulties and complexities presented
for account holders in the event of a relevant intermediary insolvency, with examples and lessons drawn from the insolvency proceedings in New York for Lehman Brothers Holdings,
Inc. (holding company of the Lehman group) and Lehman Brothers, Inc. (the United States
broker-dealer) and in London for Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (Lehman’s primary
European broker)).
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III. The Roles of Private Law and Market Regulation In
Securities Holding Infrastructures And Initiatives For Reform
Private law features of the various securities holding systems summarized above play a paramount role in the operation of the securities markets
and the securities holding infrastructures on which such markets are based.
The same is also true for the levels of transparency in the various types of
holding systems. Whether an investor holds directly with an issuer or
through an intermediary, there necessarily exists a relationship of some
market participant—whether a CSD, another intermediary, or an investor—
with the issuer. For equity (for example, shares) in a corporation, this involves corporation or company law, and for debt securities (for example,
bonds or notes), it involves the law governing the issuer’s obligations and
the contractual terms of the securities. Most significantly, of course, an investor expects to acquire a proprietary interest in the securities.
Each of the prototypical intermediated holding structures summarized
above contemplates in some fashion the existence and nature of an account
holder’s proprietary interest. But the structures vary enormously as to the
location and nature of the proprietary interests of the various market participants. Moreover, these applicable private law rules achieve much more than
a determination of private rights. They provide the “plumbing” on which the
29
infrastructure for trading, settlement, and holding securities are grounded.
These private law regimes “can play a significant role in reducing not only
30
legal risks of market participants but systemic risk as well.” This metaphor
conceiving of private law as the “plumbing” for securities holding structures
is necessarily and importantly supplemented by regulatory regimes for securities markets and market participants that provide a framework for linking
together the operational components of holding systems. This is due in large
part to the ubiquitous presence and important role of regulated intermediaries such as securities firms (for example, stockbrokers and dealers) and
banks in securities holding systems as well as the generally accepted need
for regulation and supervision of securities markets more generally.
The Client Asset Reports of IOSCO reflect this crucial role of regulation. However, the Reports generally fail to address the reductions of intermediary risk that could result from improvements in intermediated holdings
systems in the areas of private law, technological infrastructures, transparency (or non-transparency), and insolvency law. They generally accept the
fundamental characteristics of the various holding systems and private law
regimes essentially as they exist. On this assumption, the Client Asset Reports propose and defend a variety of sound prophylactic measures for pro29.
Charles W. Mooney, Jr. & Hideki Kanda, Core Issues Under the UNIDROIT (Geneva) Convention on Intermediated Securities: Views from the United States and Japan, in
INTERMEDIATED SECURITIES: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND PRACTICAL ISSUES 69, 76 (Louise
Gullifer & Jennifer Payne eds., 2010).
30.
Id. (citing and quoting draft recommendations prepared by a group organized by the
European System of Central Banks and the Committee of European Securities Regulators).
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tecting client assets. The Global Standards proposed here would abandon
that assumption and extend their reach to the private law and to all other as31
pects of holding infrastructures.
The past several decades have witnessed numerous efforts—on national
and international levels—to harmonize, rationalize, and reform both the private law principles and the infrastructures for the settlement of trades and
32
the holding of securities. The wide variety of intermediated holding structures described in Part II reflect the results of some of these efforts on the
national levels. But efforts for harmonization and reform on the international level have been met with very limited success. This is so notwithstanding
enormous efforts in connection with three significant projects—the Hague
33
Securities Convention (“HSC”), the Geneva Securities Convention
34
35
(“GSC”), and the European Legal Certainty project. Of course, each of
these projects contributed substantially to knowledge and common understanding; declaring them to be failures would be too harsh a judgment. That
none of them has resulted in meaningful harmonization results in part from
the widely differing securities holding systems, regulatory philosophies, and
private law traditions. This suggests the need for a fresh approach that differs from these “traditional” processes for the development and harmonization of hard law (such as international conventions, EU directives or regulations, or model law texts). The development of Global Standards advocated
in Part V reflects such a new approach.
IOSCO’s Client Asset Reports were inspired in part by “[e]vents in recent years including the Lehman Brothers and MF Global insolvencies
36
[that] have placed client asset protection regimes in the spotlight.” The
2014 IOSCO Report provided eight principles intended to apply as between
an intermediary and its clients (that is, account holders) and to provide pro-

31.
See text at supra nn. 29–30 (discussing role of private law in reducing risks of market participants as well as systemic risk). The approach of the Geneva Securities Convention
and the European Legal Certainty project generally assumed the continuation of existing
structures for securities holding, but the Global Standards advocated here would not be so
constrained.
32.
See MATTHIAS HAENTJENS, HARMONISATION OF SECURITIES LAW 217 (Martijn
Hesselink et al. eds., 2007) (discussing harmonization initiatives).
33.
Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities Held
with an Intermediary, Intermediary, July 5, 2006, T.I.A.S. No. 17-401401.
34.
Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities, Oct. 9, 2009,
http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/capital-markets/geneva-convention [hereinafter GSC];
see also Legislative Guide, supra note 11. The Legislative Guide recognizes that there are
many gaps in the GSC’s scope and substance that were left to the non-Convention law. Id. at
35–36. It offers guidance to states as to areas in need of legislative and regulatory treatment,
which were not fully addressed and harmonized in the GSC. Id.
35.
See Legal Certainty Group, Second Advice of the Legal Certainty Group: Solutions
to Legal Barriers Related to Post-Trading Within the EU, (2008), https://ec.europa.eu/info/
system/files/legal-certainty-group-2nd-advice_en.pdf.
36.
2014 IOSCO Report, supra note 6, at 1.
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tections for assets (for example, securities) held in securities accounts. The
principles relate to matters including record keeping, account statements,
safeguarding clients’ rights and minimizing risks of loss and misuse of assets, understanding and dealing with assets in foreign jurisdictions, clear
disclosures of protections regimes and risks involved, arrangements relating
to client waivers of protections, regulatory oversight of intermediary compliance, and regulatory oversight of domestic rules concerning foreign as38
sets. These principles reflect the crucial roles played by intermediaries and
the related regulatory regimes. For example, the operative language of six of
39
the principles includes the phrase “intermediary should” in them. For two
40
of the principles, the language includes a “regulator should” in them. A
final principle addresses what “arrangements should” provide in connection
41
with client waivers or modifications of protections.
The 2017 IOSCO Report documents the success of the recommendations and the enormous influence of IOSCO in respect of the thirty-six participating jurisdictions. It concluded that “the majority of participating jurisdictions have generally adopted a client asset protection regime described
42
by the Principles.”
For present purposes, the Client Asset Reports support each of two ostensibly—but not actually—conflicting claims made here. The first claim is
quite obvious: The Client Asset Reports and the various States’ actions
based on and in response to the Client Asset Reports represent important
steps in reducing the most significant risk imposed by currently existing se43
curities holding structures—intermediary risk. Along this path toward risk
reduction, the Client Asset Reports also provide an excellent example
44
among many of the expertise and quality of analysis that IOSCO is capable of marshaling. Second, while the Client Asset Reports and States’ responses reflect some improvements and reduction of intermediary risk, they
also clearly demonstrate the continued existence of intermediary risk and, I
45
would argue, the need to address it. Part IV, next, reconciles and explains
these claims.

37.
2014 IOSCO Report, supra note 6, at 3–9.
38.
2014 IOSCO Report, supra note 6, at 3–9.
39.
2014 IOSCO Report, supra note 6, at 3–6.
40.
2014 IOSCO Report, supra note 6, at 7–9.
41.
2014 IOSCO Report, supra note 6, at 6.
42.
2017 IOSCO Report, supra note 6, at 32.
43.
See supra Part I (discussing intermediary risk).
44.
A listing of IOSCO’s public reports may be found at Public Reports, INT’L ORG.
SEC. COMMISSIONS https://www.iosco.org/publications/?subsection=public_reports (last visited Mar. 28, 2019).
45.
I should acknowledge (but without apologies) that I have changed my views as to
the inevitability of intermediary risk in this context. Once upon a time, I supported reforms of
the intermediated holding systems under prevailing law in the United States that centered on
the identification and management of intermediary risk. The reforms that I proposed, support-
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IV. The Case for Reforming Securities Holding
Infrastructures: Reduction or Elimination Of Intermediary
Risk and The Emergence of Fintech
Making and supporting the case for further reforms of securities holding
structures is beyond the modest scope and permissible length of this Article.
Instead, a brief but (hopefully) clear and straightforward outline must suffice. In other work, Kumiko Koens and I suggest that Fintech may offer an
46
avenue for eliminating intermediary risk in securities holding systems.
While the Client Asset Reports and the principles that they advance address
and evaluate the reduction of intermediary risk, each of the principles is a
mirror image of the persistence of the risks that continue to exist. In the absence of such risks, these principles would be unnecessary. The fundamental
sources of this risk are the indispensable roles of intermediaries in securities
transactions and settlement. Because connecting investors directly with issuers as direct holders under legacy systems is cumbersome, timeconsuming, and relatively expensive, for many investors, the only practical
47
choice is to hold securities through an intermediary. The securities thereby
ed, and accepted assumed the existence of intermediary risk as a given in the securities market
infrastructure. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer and
Pledge of Interests in Securities Controlled by Intermediaries, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 305, 388
(1990) (“It appears that the single, most powerful, control that a market participant can employ to reduce intermediary risk is to exercise precaution by selecting an intermediary that
will not fail.”). That article had considerable influence, which persists almost three decades
later. Philipp Paech has cited this work as “the first . . . to analyse the legal consequences of”
the emergence of “the concept of securities intermediation through banks and brokers” in the
United States. Philipp Paech, Securities, Intermediation and the Blockchain: An Inevitable
Choice Between Liquidity and Legal Certainty?, 21 UNIFORM L. REV. 612, 617 (2016). Francis Facciolo has noted the significance of the work in the development of law in the United
States. See Francis J. Facciolo, Father Knows Best: Revised Article 8 and the Individual Investor, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.615, 635 (2000) (“Professor Charles W. Mooney, Jr., the legal
academic whose ideas form the intellectual underpinnings of Revised [Uniform Commercial
Code] Article 8 . . . .”) (footnote omitted); id. at 664 (“Professor Mooney proposed the model
of ‘upper-tier priority,’ which became the intellectual foundation of Revised Article 8 . . . .”)
(footnote omitted); id. at 669 (“Professor Mooney, the intellectual progenitor Revised Article
8’s general approach . . . .”); id. at 697 n.473 (“Professor Mooney’s influential article advocating a complete revision of 1977 Article 8 . . . Professor Mooney brought his own well thought
out approach to the process of revising 1977 Article 8, one congruent enough to that of the
federal regulators to be included in the Bankers Trust Company report.”).
46.
Professor Koens and I propose a “new platform” holding structure that would eliminate intermediary risk in securities holding systems. It would connect ultimate account holders/investors with issuers of securities—a direct holding structure. This connection, as the last
step in the settlement process and possibly employing DLT, would replace the credit of securities to a securities account held with an intermediary. See Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond
Intermediation: A New (Fintech) Model For Securities Holding Infrastructures (unpublished
presentation) (outlining “new platform” securities holding structure and arguing that modern
technology has eliminated the need for intermediation in securities holding structures) (on file
with author).
47.
CSDs in the United States (The Depository Trust Company) and the United Kingdom and Ireland (CREST) provide for connecting investors to direct registration systems for
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remain in the intermediated system so as to be readily available for trading
and settlement. The intermediary risk arises because holding securities
through an intermediary necessarily confers on the intermediary some degree and character of power and control over the securities maintained in a
securities account. This is so under all of the various holding systems summarized above, whether the intermediary, for example, is the actual or nominal holder of securities in the chain of title, as under law applicable in the
United States and under English law, or has no such interest, as under
48
French law. It follows that the only reasons for maintaining this sort of intermediation that causes this intermediary risk are the prevailing characteristics of existing holding systems themselves (including cumbersome legacy
systems of direct holding).
Two related circumstances offer the prospect of eliminating intermediary risk from securities holding systems. First, Fintech offers the potential
for new systems of securities holding that could eliminate, reduce, or materially alter intermediated holding. Second, Fintech developments have
placed the prospect for fundamental changes in the structure of financial
markets—including securities trading, settlement, and holding—squarely on
49
the table. It follows that arguments based on the rationale that “this is the
way our systems work” may no longer be persuasive, if they ever were. The
50
mindsets of major market participants may be evolving.
Global Standards developed by an IOSCO-led working group would of
course be soft law, inasmuch as the standards would not be formulated within a legislative body or a governmental agency and would not have any
51
binding force until adopted by States. But the standards would be “soft
equity (but not debt) securities. See Direct Registration System, DEPOSITORY TR. &
CLEARING CORP., http://www.dtcc.com/settlement-and-asset-services/securities-processing/
direct-registration-system (last visited Mar. 28, 2019); Euroclear UK & Ireland: Personal
Membership, EUROCLEAR, https://www.euroclear.com/dam/Brochures/Personal-membershipEUI.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2019). But associated delay and costs of these systems generally
make them impractical for use by active investors.
48.
See supra Part II (discussing models for intermediated securities holding systems).
49.
See, e.g., DTCC, EMBRACING DISRUPTION: TAPPING THE POTENTIAL OF
DISTRIBUTED LEDGERS TO IMPROVE THE POST-TRADE LANDSCAPE 9–17 (2016),
http://hub.digitalasset.com/hubfs/Industry%20Reports/dtcc-embracing-disruption.pdf [hereinafter DTCC REPORT]; IOSCO, IOSCO RESEARCH REPORT ON FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGIES
(FINTECH) 52–58 (2017), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD554.pdf [hereinafter IOSCO FINTECH REPORT].
50.
It is notable, however, that the various explorations of Fintech/DLT by major institutions do not appear to have focused on the potential for the reduction or elimination of intermediary risk. For example, neither the DTC Report nor the IOSCO Fintech Report addresses that potential benefit. DTCC REPORT, supra note 49; IOSCO FINTECH REPORT, supra note
49.
51.
See Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 171, 187–88 (2010) (“Examples of this type of soft law abound.”). Of course, an
international convention also is not binding until such time as it enters into force. But unlike a
convention (or model law), the Global Standards contemplated here would not consist of harmonized (or model) statutory text or specific doctrinal rules.
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law” of a special character. Not only would the Global Standards be developed by an intergovernmental organization, IOSCO, but by an organization
whose members are the very governmental regulators responsible for administering the standards. Global Standards developed by IOSCO would be
sui generis in another aspect. Private law reforms generally have been left to
other bodies and not seen as a central aspect of regulatory reform. But in the
context of securities holding infrastructures, this should change. Efforts at
relevant harmonization and modernization of private law within Europe and
through UNIDROIT (the GSC) generally have not been met with success.
This may be contrasted with the success of IOSCO in connection with the
Client Asset Reports and the success of Basel Committee in the area of bank
52
prudential regulation. Moreover, the increasing significance of Fintech and
the potential for DLT to influence future developments make this an appro53
priate time for bold initiatives.

V. Soft Law Global Standards for Hard Law Reform: A
Central Role for IOSCO and A Tentative Mission Statement
This Part advocates the development of “soft law” Global Standards for
the infrastructure for the holding of publicly traded securities. It argues that
a process led by IOSCO would provide the optimal environment for the development of these standards. These Global Standards would be available
for the adoption by States (“hard law”) as core components of States’ relevant regulatory, technological, and private law infrastructure for securities
holding.
Two preliminary points should be made clear: first, the proposal for
IOSCO-led development of Global Standards is supported by, but not dependent upon, the case for reform just made. That reform proposal is an example, albeit an important one in my view, of how adjustments in private
law and holding structures could reduce intermediary risk in securities holding systems. But the overarching point is that adjustments in the private law
as well as in regulatory and technological aspects of holding structures
could improve holding systems. As noted above, the Client Asset Reports
54
do not embrace that approach.
Second, Global Standards could provide guidance and structure for
Fintech in the context of the securities markets. Experts possessing experience and knowledge of the securities markets, the legal and regulatory environments, and the components of safe and efficient operations are the best
actors for setting standards for technology to meet. Instead, it seems that, in
52.
See infra Part V.
53.
See infra at pp. 18–21(discussing timeliness of developing the Global Standards).
54.
See supra Part III (discussing role of private law in reducing risks of market participants as well as systemic risk). The approach of the GSC and the European Legal Certainty
project generally assumed the continuation of existing infrastructures for securities holding.
But the Global Standards advocated here would not be so constrained.
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some respects, the legal establishment is following technological develop55
ments and structures like apocryphal lemmings jumping off of cliffs. This
approach should be modified and balanced. In many contexts, those with
market expertise should establish standards and goals and call upon Fintech
to find solutions.
Several considerations lend strong support for the leading role of
IOSCO in the soft-law-to-hard-law Global Standards approach proposed
here and for the timeliness of the proposed reforms of securities holding infrastructures. No doubt the strongest data point supporting this central role
is the success of the implementation of the principles articulated in the Cli56
ent Asset Reports. Another is the analogous role and exemplary cooperation of bank regulators in the work of the Basel Committee on capital re57
58
quirements for commercial banks. The 1988 Basel I accord has been
described as “the first major success for international regulatory coopera59
tion,” and it was “widely followed” by bank regulators. While subsequent
iterations (Basel II and III) have encountered a more checkered route, cluttered with political realities and fallout from the 2008-09 financial crisis, the
60
level of cooperation among regulators has remained strong.
The Global Standards based on a consensus of relevant State regulators
61
would provide a powerful incentive for States to adopt compliant hard law.
Because the Global Standards would reflect a consensus of governmental
62
actors (regulators), one might expect much less resistance to adoptions by

55.
Current efforts to assess and deal with legal issues arising out of the custody of digital assets and problems associated with access through private keys provide an illustration.
See, e.g., Moe Adham, Crypto Custody Explained, FORBES COMMUNITY VOICE
(Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesfinancecouncil/2018/12/18/cryptocustody-explained/#2a3b2f9e1379. I do not suggest that lawyers should not be called upon to
grapple with these issues; indeed, they must. But, ideally, counsel would be involved in the
process of creating systems for acquiring, holding, and transferring financial assets to the end
that these functions could occur without (or with minimal) problems of accessibility or intermediary risk.
56.
See supra Part III.
57.
See infra nn. 59–60.
58.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards (July 1988), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf.
59.
MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., supra note 2, at 285.
60.
For a survey of these developments and various related commentary, see MICHAEL
S. BARR ET AL., supra note 2, at 285–332.
61.
See Part III (discussing influence of Client Asset Reports and Basel Committee).
62.
Given the specialized nature of securities holding infrastructures, buy-in by a
state’s securities regulators would be important, probably essential, for a state’s adoption of
the Global Standards. The IOSCO pedigree could encourage such support. Moreover, the
roles of commercial banks, bank regulators, and central banks are also important in the setting
of the securities markets and, in particular, in connection with settlement and holding structures. One would hope that the Basel Committee, central banks, and other representatives of
the banking industry would play a role in the development of the Global Standards by IOSCO.
There are many examples of such cooperation between banking interests and IOSCO in past

544

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 40:531

States than would typically be the case with a convention or model law or
principles adopted by a more generalist, less specialized intergovernmental
organization. The expertise, reputation, and past successes of IOSCO products (such as the Client Asset Reports) also would contribute to the influence of the Global Standards. Moreover, unlike the GSC, the Global Standards would not dictate a harmonized, uniform text but would instead offer
general principles that could accommodate the prevailing wide variations in
legal traditions, regulatory approaches, and holding infrastructures. This
may be contrasted with the absence of success of the GSC (at least as measured by the absence of adoptions) and the breakdown of harmonization and
63
modernization efforts within the EU. That said, IOSCO would not be embarking on the project on a clean slate. Its own work, reflected by the Client
Asset Reports, as well as the prior efforts leading to the GSC, the Legislative Guide, and the European Legal Certainty project provide enormously
useful points of departure.
Professor Cally Jordan recently criticized IOSCO’s international standard-setting role as well as its process for the formulation of standards. She
argued that IOSCO’s role as a “quasi-regulator” is “on a collision course
64
with powerful state-level regulators.” While I take exception with several
aspects of Jordan’s assessment and conclusions, this Article does not engage
that debate. It is sufficient to note that the IOSCO role in developing the
Global Standards, which is advocated here, could escape the principal criticisms that Jordan has advanced. For example, consider the goal of reducing,
or perhaps eliminating, intermediary risk in securities holding structures.
The Global Standards should eschew the “one-size-fits-all” approach that
65
Jordan assails. Moreover, the Global Standards should focus on the content of the standards, which should not be subordinated to the goal of har66
monization. In addition, the development of the Global Standards should
projects. See, e.g., IOSCO, Analysis of Central Clearing Interdependencies, FR12/2017(July
5, 2017), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD570.pdf (Released by: the
Bank for International Settlements (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and Committee
on Payments and Market Infrastructures), the Financial Stability Board, and IOSCO).
63.
See supra Part III.
64.
CALLY JORDAN, THE NEW INTERNATIONALISM? IOSCO, INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS AND CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 1 (Ctr. for Int’l Governance Innovation
Papers No. 189, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3257800 [hereinafter NEW INTERNATIONALISM]; see also CALLY JORDAN, BEYOND INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS: MAPPING THE FUTURE OF CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 5 (Ctr. for Int’l
Governance Innovation Policy Brief No. 136, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3258456 [hereinafter MAPPING]. For a more positive view of international financial regulatory coordination, see HADAR YOANA JABOTINSKY & BARAK
YARKONI, THE NETWORK EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION (Hebrew U.
Legal. Stud. Res. Paper Series No. 19-04, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3298597 (explaining positive network effects that induce States to
adopt global financial regulatory standards).
65.
NEW INTERNATIONALISM, supra note 64, at 6.
66.
NEW INTERNATIONALISM, supra note 64, at 5.
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involve participation by a broadly representative group of stakeholders and
experts, including in particular academics, research institutions, and other
67
intergovernmental organizations.
This is a propitious time for the development of Global Standards, as
explained above. This is so in part because of the prominence of Fintech in68
terests in the current discourse within the financial markets. The emerging
significance of DLT-based technology and its potentially disruptive impact
are particularly important. A diverse group of players are considering the
ways that DLT might be applied in the context of securities trading, settle69
ment, and holding. Minds—and purses—may be opening to the possibilities of fundamental changes in financial market architectures.
Finally, what matters should the Global Standards address? What
should be their substantive content? What level of detail should they embrace? In short, what should be the mission statement? This Article does not
aspire to provide comprehensive and detailed answers to these questions,
but the somewhat abstract proposal advanced thus far would benefit from
some further explication. What I do not have in mind is any duplication of
initiatives of the Fintech community or of the various initiatives of market
participants and regulators in the Fintech sphere. Instead, the Global Standards would provide normative and functional guidance for what it is that
Fintech should achieve and the results to which it should aspire.
I also do not envision the need for any sharp dichotomy between “regulatory” and “private law” approaches to the standards. In general, however,
earlier projects would provide useful points of departure. For example, the
principles embodied in the GSC and the alternatives outlined in the Legislative Guide represent plausible baselines for discussion from the perspective
of private law. That the rules reflected in the GSC text are not “new” does
not offer a plausible objection to including them (as appropriate and as may
be agreed) in the Global Standards. The point is that they have not been
universally implemented, and the Global Standards could be a more successful means of implementation than an international convention. The Client Asset Reports offer similar reference points on important regulatory aspects. A significant challenge could be to encourage IOSCO to take on the
task of considering the need to modify private law and the standards for securities holding infrastructures as integral components of the Global Standards. Another challenge would be the development of Global Standards that
incorporate functional standards and sufficient flexibility for the evolution
of infrastructures to take advantage of emerging (and evolving) technology
while also providing sufficiently concrete guidance as to the outcomes and
performance required for holding systems to be compliant. A third challenge would be to preserve the flexibility and nimbleness of existing inter67.
See MAPPING, supra note 64, at 6 n.22 (noting criticism of absence of broad participation in IOSCO projects).
68.
See supra Part IV.
69.
See supra Part IV.
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mediated systems so as to accommodate existing and future transactional
70
patterns of financing and collateralization.
To be more specific, one standard already discussed—and by far the
71
most important one in my view—relates to intermediary risk. The standard
might provide that investors should not be exposed to any risks arising out
of post-settlement failure or default of an intermediary. But this standard
would benefit from a penumbra of corollaries. For example, eliminating intermediary risk by connecting an investor directly with an issuer (that is, by
disintermediation of holding) should not involve any sacrifice of transactional flexibility when compared to current systems. And an investor should
have access to and control over its securities for purposes of trading and col72
lateralization in a secure and user-friendly manner. As already suggested,
that current systems cannot meet such a standard is an inadequate response.
Meeting the Global Standards would be a job for Fintech to solve and for
States to facilitate by making any necessary changes in private laws and
regulations.

VI. Conclusion
Intermediaries such as stockbrokers and banks are ubiquitous in global
securities markets. They play essential roles in all aspects of the markets,
including trading, settling trades, and post-settlement holding of securities.
This Article focuses in particular on the roles of intermediaries in securities
holding systems. It proposes an IOSCO-led “soft-law-to-hard-law” approach to the development of Global Standards for reforms to these holding
systems. The reforms would embrace not only important standards of a
functional and regulatory nature, such as the principles addressed in
IOSCO’s Client Asset Reports, but also would address holistic standards
relating as well to the private law, insolvency law, and the technical aspects
of infrastructures for securities holding systems. The Global Standards envisioned here, however, would not propose model text or even doctrinal rules.
Instead, they would establish the results that holding systems should
achieve, such as the elimination of intermediary risk.

70.
See Joanna Benjamin, Stewardship and Collateral, 12 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 312 (2017).
71.
See supra Part IV.
72.
For example, the crude forms of intermediation that have grown up around cryptocurrencies (“wallets,” “cold storage,” and the like) would be unacceptable for a holding system for publicly traded securities. See Adham, supra note 55 (discussing such intermediation).
For a good first step toward the licensing and regulation of non-bank, non-broker-dealer intermediaries for crypto-currency, see UNIFORM REGULATION OF VIRTUAL-CURRENCY
BUSINESSES ACT (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2017); see also UNIFORM SUPPLEMENTAL
COMMERCIAL LAW FOR THE UNIFORM REGULATION OF VIRTUAL-CURRENCY BUSINESSES
ACT (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2018) (adapting U.C.C. art. 8 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2018) for crypto-currency held by securities intermediaries). For an overview of
these uniform laws, see Fred Miller, A New Payment Method and More, 72 CONSUMER FIN.
L.Q. REP. 119 (2019).
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As the principal organization for the coordination and cooperation
among securities market regulators, and with a track record of producing
excellent and important studies and reports, IOSCO is singularly well suited
to lead the development of Global Standards. Ideally, it would do so with
the participation and cooperation of bank regulators and central banks as
well as the securities and banking industries. But the development of holistic Global Standards for securities holding systems would face challenges.
One challenge would be to confront the need for reforms to the private
law. Here, cooperation of legal professionals (practitioners, judges, and academics) would be essential. Involvement of organizations with relevant experience such as UNIDROIT and the European Commission also would be
crucial. Another set of challenges would arise from the importance of considering reforms to the holding infrastructures (for example, increased
transparency in holding systems). But the ongoing and increasing role of
Fintech in the financial markets means that securities (and other) regulators
must face these challenges in any event. Possibly the most difficult challenges would arise from within the securities industry. One could expect resistance from market participants who (quite understandably) wish to preserve their positions and roles in the securities markets and their current and
future business plans. But this is one of the principal reasons that regulators
(through IOSCO in particular) should play a leading role in the process, although participation of industry obviously would be important.
Finally, a useful next step might be a high level, broadly representative,
working conference to discuss prospects for Global Standards and to plan
and organize their development. The past efforts of UNIDROT in the area
of capital markets, in particular in the adoption of the GSC and the promulgation of the Legislative Guide, would commend it as an organizer and
sponsor of such a conference. I hope that this Article might provoke further
discussions and ultimately affirmative steps toward the development of
Global Standards for securities holding systems.

